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Real-Time Early Warning and Early Prevention
System to Avoid System Blackouts
H. Jóhannsson Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper presents a real-time early warning and
early prevention (EWEP) system which objective is to avoid
the occurrence of large scale system blackouts. The EWEP is
obtained by combining a state-of-the-art methods for online sta-
bility assessment and for identifying effective counteractions into
a single operational solution. The EWEP system was implemented
on state-of-the-art software platform for applications of wide-area
data. The EWEP system’s performance was tested on synthetic
wide-area measurement snapshots obtained by accurate time
domain simulation of the 2003 blackout in Denmark and Sweden.
The test results show that the system could automatically provide
both an early warning for the blackout and efficiently determine
effective countermeasures that would have avoided the blackout
from occurring.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stable and secure supply of electric energy is of fundamen-
tal importance for welfare and growth in any modern society.
System blackouts are a strong reminder of how dependent the
modern society is on secure and stable operation of electric
power systems. Considering a future systems scenario where
high share of production is based on renewable energy sources
(RES), it is foreseen that the fluctuating nature of RES will
affect the systems’ dynamic behavior. The altered dynam-
ics are likely to cause existing offline and time consuming
approaches, today used to ensure secure operation, to be-
come insufficient. Hence, real-time approaches for operational
awareness will be needed in future highly RES based systems.
Resent research has begun to address the challenge of ensur-
ing system security in real-time. In [1] a method is presented
for real-time assessment of aperiodic small-signal rotor angle
(ASSRA) stability, based on algebraically derived expressions
for critical stability boundaries [2] which laid the foundation
for assessment of large systems in matter of milliseconds [3].
Online sensitivity based voltage stability assessment was pre-
sented in [4–5] while extensions to Thevenin impedance based
assessment were presented in [6–8]. New approach for static
security assessment in real-time is reported in [9–10]. Two
different approaches for identifying effective countermeasures
against ASSRA stability problems were presented in [11–
12]. In [13], approach for finding countermeasures to avoid
activation of over-excitation limiters is presented.
This paper presents a real-time early warning and preven-
tion (EWEP) system that extends previous research within
real-time stability assessment and automatic determination of
countermeasures by implementing and combining them into a
single operational solution. For this purpose a dedicated SW-
platform for test and implementation of applications of wide-
area data [14–15] is exploited. The proposed EWEP system
is tested on a realistic blackout scenario, obtained by detailed
simulation of the 2003 Blackout in Denmark and Sweden.
The paper is structured as follows: section II covers back-
ground theory for the real-time stability assessment and the
countermeasure methods used for obtaining early warning and
early prevention, section III describes the implementation and
setup of the EWEP system, section IV covers details of the
large-scale blackout test scenario, section VI presents test
results and the paper is concluded in section VII.
II. METHODS PROVIDING EARLY WARNING AND EARLY
PREVENTION FOR INSTABILITY
A. The Early Warning Method
The early warning method deployed in the following and
described in [1], exploits online system snapshots (from
synchronphasors or state estimator) to quickly determine the
generators’ margin in respect to ASSRA instability. Due to al-
gebraically derived expressions for ASSRA stability boundary
[2], assessment in linear time is enabled [3]. For the assess-
ment of each generator Gi in the system, only two system vari-
ables need to be determined; the complex Thevenin impedance
Zth seen from the generator’s node of constant steady-state
voltage magnitude and its complex injection impedance Zin j
seen from the same node determined by the ratio between the
complex voltage and injected generator current. To preserve
ASSRA stability, each generator Gi must satisfy [1]:
Zin j ≥
−Zth sinθ
sinφ
(1)
Where Zth = Zth 6 φ and Zin j = Zin j 6 θ . Violation of (1)
describes the condition where a small change in the generator’s
rotor angle will reduce the generators active steady-state power
output instead of increasing it. This results in an imbalance
between the generator’s mechanical and electrical torque,
resulting in small but gradually increasing rotor acceleration
leading to loss of synchronism characterized by sharp collapse
in system voltages. It can take from 10 seconds up to few min-
utes following disturbance for ASSRA instability to unfold.
An active power percentage margin %∆Pin j to the stability
boundaries reflected in (2) can be expressed as [1]:
%∆Pin j =
cos(δ +φth)+ 1
1+
∣∣∣ Zin j
Zth+Zin j
∣∣∣cos(φth)
·100%. (2)
The above margins describe how much the generator’s
active power injection can be increased before (1) is violated.
Here δ = arg(Zin j/(Zin j+Zth)) represents the voltage phase angle
at generator’s node of constant voltage when the Thevenin
voltage is used as reference. The above expression provides a
convenient measure of the generators’ distance-to-instability,
and is used as an early warning indicator in the following.
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B. The Early Prevention Method
The early prevention method deployed in the EWEP system
is based on approach from [11] which determines remedial
actions by exploiting algebraically derived expressions from
[2]. The determined countermeasures are in the form of
setpoints adjustment of selected generators’ output.
The method’s objective is to ensure that the margin of a crit-
ical generator to ASSRA instability does not go below certain
minimum. For that purpose, two different margins are defined:
trigger margin which determines when the countermeasures
should at latest be applied, and safety margin at which the
generator should be operating after the countermeasure.
In case that the margin of a generator goes below the trigger
margin, generator’s output has to be reduced to bring the
generator’s margin above the safety margin. The desired safety
margin msa f is expressed as a percentage of the generator’s
maximum power injection. Utilizing expressions for curves
of constant voltage magnitude and phase angle injection
impedance plane from [2], the generator’s voltage angle when
operating at safety margin δ ∗ can be determined as [11]:
δ ∗ = arccos
(
msa f
100%
(
1+
V
Eth
cosφth
)
− 1
)
−φth (3)
Here is V the generator’s voltage at its node of constant
voltage magnitude, and Eth =V |Zin j+Zth|/Zin j is the correspond-
ing Thevenin voltage magnitude. With δ ∗ known, the needed
change in the critical generator’s output ∆Pcr becomes:
∆P =
(
EthV
Zth
)
· (cos(δ +φth)− cos(δ
∗+φth)) (4)
Knowing the critical generator’s ∆Pcr, the other generators
participating in the dispatch solution can be determined. The
following procedure is suggested to find generators that should
increase their production to counteract the reduction from the
critical generator Gcr.
1) Rank all of the N generators in list according to shortest
electrical distance [16] to Gcr and determine their active
power reserve ∆Pi, without exceeding ASSRAS safety
margin or Gi’s thermal limit.
2) For every generator Gi, i ∈ 1 . . .N in the sorted list, do:
a) mark in the list if Gi’s available ∆Pi is greater or
equal to 1/1, 1/2,1/3 or 1/4 of the needed ∆Pcr
b) Inspect the list from G1 . . .Gi for a solution with
1, 2, 3 or 4 generators. If a solution is found, the
search is stopped.
The above procedure prioritizes solutions consisting of 2-4
generators relatively close to Gcr over a solution with a single
generator relatively far away.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 1 illustrates the EWEP system deployed in this
paper. The system consists of SW-platform for application
of wide-area data [14–15] and three individual applications
containing implementation of the previously described EWEP
methods, and a supervisory and visualization application. The
SW-platform obtains measurement snapshots from the external
system (represented by offline PSS/E simulations in this pa-
per) and makes them available to the individual applications.
Representation of the
tested power system
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Fig. 1. Illustration of highly distributed EWEP system setup deployed in
this paper. The wide-area application SW-platform reads in measurements
from the external system (represented by offline PSS/E results in this case)
and provides the external applications access to the measurements. In future
work, the offline simulations will be replaced by direct connections to SCADA
systems in real power systems.
The SW-platform makes the results, computed by individual
applications, available to any of the other applications that
can make use of them. In the EWEP system, the results
from the EW method are sent back to the SW-platform which
makes them available to the EP method that uses the results
to determine appropriate countermeasures. Both of the EW
and EP results are communicated to the supervisory and
visualization application that executes the EP when necessary.
To perform a large scale test of the EWEP system, offline
PSS/E simulations of a large scale blackout are used as
input to the system. To apply a countermeasure, the EWEP
system produces a PSS/E simulation script file containing the
details of the countermeasure and afterwards the simulation is
repeated to study the countermeasure’s effect.
IV. THE 2003 BLACKOUT IN DENMARK AND SWEDEN
At midday September 23rd 2003 a series of incidents
occurred which eventually led to a blackout of the eastern part
of Denmark and the southern part of Sweden. The blackout
resulted in approximately 2.4 million persons in eastern Den-
mark and approximately 0.5 million persons in the southern
part of Sweden being without electricity and approximately
18GWh of electricity was not delivered to the customers.
The following describes the events causing the blackout
and establishes a time line of events. Additionally, references
to documents containing measurement data from the time of
the blackout are provided. The information provided in the
following is mainly gathered from the two official reports from
the blackout, one in Danish [17] and the other in Swedish [18].
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Fig. 2. The pre-fault conditions in the the 400kV grid in E-Denmark and S-Sweden. The generators in Zealand represent an aggregation of several generators
in corresponding area, while the generators in Swedish part represent the individual generating units that where operating prior to the blackout.
A. The Power System in Sweden and Denmark (2003)
Figure 3 shows the 400kV grid in Sweden and E-Denmark
along with the major thermal and hydro power plants. The
Swedish power system was constructed such that the vast
hydro power resources in north could be utilized in best
way. This led to a construction of a strong transmission grid
between the northern part and the central and southern part of
Sweden where the main consumptions areas are located.
In Eastern Denmark (Zealand) the distance between the
main power plants and the main consumption areas is short.
The generation consisted of large coal-fired units (up to
650MW ), combined heat and power plants and a significant
amount of wind power. The Swedish grid and the Zealand grid
are connected through a pair of 400kV cables and another pair
of 132kV cables with total cross-country capacity of 1900MW .
B. Pre-fault Conditions
The pre-fault operating conditions were stable and well
within the security constraint laid out in operational planning
[19]. Some production units and overhead lines were not in
operation due to seasonal maintenance. Figure 2 shows the pre-
fault condition in the southern part of Sweden and Zealand.
The figure shows which 400kV lines were out of order before
the disturbances and the operating units in southern Sweden
and information about production and consumption in the
area. The available reserves in Eastern Denmark prior to the
blackout were 775MW which was more than sufficient to cope
with the loss of any single production unit in E-Denmark
[17]. The Swedish system was moderately loaded prior to the
disturbance with total consumption approximately 15.000MW
nearly half of the maximum yearly consumption [18]. In S-
Sweden, the consumption was approximately 3.000MW [17].
C. Involved Events/Disturbances
1) First Event - Oskarshamn: The first incident leading up
to the blackout was the loss of a 1200MW nuclear unit at
the Oskarshamn plant (bus 23 in figure 2), due to a valve
problem in the feedwater circuits. The fault led to reduction
of production from 1.176MW to 800MW within 10s and a full
shut-down after another 10s.
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Fig. 3. The 400kV system in Sweden and Zealand (E-Denmark). There is
strong connection between the hydro-generation in north and the consumption
areas in central and southern part of Sweden. The numbered substations in
the figure correspond to the bus numbers from figure 2.
The fault was a standard contingency for which the system
coped with without any subsequent interruptions. Voltages
stayed within normal operating range and the frequency stabi-
lized slightly below the normal operating limit of 49,90Hz and
hence, actions were initiated to raise the frequency. The fault
caused a redistribution of the power flow resulting in increased
flow in the E-Sweden to supply the demand in south.
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Fig. 4. The system condition after the double busbar fault in Horred (bus
7). As a consequence, practically no local production was available in the
southern part of Sweden (busses 6,7,10,14-16,18-24). The power was either
supplied from Denmark (through bus 6) or from North (through bus 25).
2) Second Event - Horred: Five minutes after the first
event, a double busbar fault occurred in a 400kV substation in
Horred in W-Sweden resulting in the loss of four 400kV lines
and two 900MW nuclear units at Ringhals. Figure 4 shows
the condition after the fault, where it can be seen that two
of the four disconnected lines made an important connection
from central Sweden to S-Sweden. The loss of the two units
resulted in that practically no power production was locally
available in the southern part of Sweden, as the remaining
Ringhals unit had no longer a connection to the South along
the western coast of Sweden. To supply S-Sweden, the power
had to come from Zealand through Söderåsen (bus 6) or from
north, through Hedenlunda (bus 25).
The fault caused powerful oscillations and a large voltage
drop in the southern part of Sweden, eventually system volt-
ages stabilized in the range of 360kV -370kV in the affected
area. Approximately 10s after the fault, the voltage in the area
began to sink first slowly then more rapidly over a period of
80s until a level below 320kV was reached.
3) Third Event - Disconnection of 400kV lines: The combi-
nation of the decreasing voltage and strongly increased power
flow from north to south resulted in activation of distance
relays on the lines between central and S-Sweden, while the
lines between Zealand and Sweden remained connected. Con-
sequently, E-Denmark and S-Sweden experienced blackout.
TABLE I
TIME LINE OF EVENTS WHICH CAUSED THE BLACKOUT IN SWEDEN AND
DENMARK ON THE SEPTEMBER 23RD, 2003.
t = 0s Valve fault at Oskarshamn (O3 at bus 23). The production is reduced
from 1176MW to 800MW within 10s.
t = 10s The fault is not cleared and the generator (O3 at bus 23) must be shut
down. The production is reduced from 800MW to 0MW over a period
of 10s.
t = 20s+ Reserves in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Jutland are activated. The
total increase in imported power is 684MW . The import from Zealand
is increased by 81MW .
t = 301s Double busbar fault in Horred - two blocks at Ringhals (R3 and R4) and
two 400kV lines (between busses 7 and 9 and between 7 and 12) are
disconnected from the net. A 1761MW production is lost.
t = 301s+ A DC-link to Jutland is disconnected - 250MW import is lost.
t = 301s+ The import from Finland and Norway gradually increases by 870MW
t = 321s+ Tap-changers begin gradually regulate the distribution voltage in the
affected area which causes gradual increase in the consumption.
t = 394s Distance relays on eight 400kV lines between central and S-Sweden trip
t = 394s Blackout occurs eastern Denmark and the Southern part of Sweden.
D. Time line of Events
Table I shows the time line of the involved events relevant
for successful time domain simulation of the blackout.
V. BLACKOUT SIMULATION AND VERIFICATION
The PSS/E simulation model consisted of a detailed rep-
resentation of the Zealand system including all busses from
400kV to 50kV and a simplified representation of the remain-
ing Scandinavian grid, where S-Sweden was represented in
greater details than remaining parts. The simulation model
contained 352 busses, 540 branches and 314 generators.
The simulation was carried out by applying the disturbances
described in table I. Figure 5 shows a comparison between
the simulated frequency and the actual measurements from the
blackout. The strong similarity between the responses indicate
that the simulation captured the right instability mechanism.
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Fig. 5. Simulated results of system frequency held against measured values
of the frequency from the blackout.
VI. TEST OF THE EWEP SYSTEM
The first test studied which early warnings (EW) the EWEP
system would produce for the simulated blackout scenario.
Figure 6 shows simulated bus voltage at the DK-SW connec-
tion, where the occurrence of the produced EWs are annotated.
The EWEP indicated 72 seconds before the blackout, that
a 74MVA machine (GA) had a stability margin lower than
0.5% and 61 seconds before the blackout the margin of a
310MVA machine (GB) went below 1.0%. Eventually, both of
the machines crossed the stability boundary resulting in their
loss of synchronism and rapid collapse in voltage as evident
from figure 6. The results confirm the ability of the EWEP
system to provide EWs and to pinpoint the critical generators.
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Fig. 6. Overview of the EW indicators provided by the EWEP system when
the simulated blackout is used as input.
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TABLE II
OVERVIEW OF THE EARLY WARNINGS (EW) AND EARLY PREVENTIVE
(EP) COUNTERMEASURES PROVIDED BY THE EWEP SYSTEM.
time Warning & proposed countermeasures
322s EW: Margin for GA ≤ 0.5%
327s EW: GA below trigger margin
327s EP: GA reduced by 2.8MW , GC increases by 2.8MW
335s EW: Margin for GB ≤ 1.0%
351s EW: Margin for GB ≤ 0.5%
358s EW: GB below trigger margin
358s EP: GB reduced by 4.8MW , GD increases by 4.8MW
Table II and figures 7 and 8 show the results from deploying
the EWEP system described in section III. The EWEP sys-
tem’s trigger margin was set to 0.4% and it’s safety margin
at 2.0%. The system applied the first countermeasure when
GA crossed 0.4% margin at t = 327s and then a second
countermeasure when GB crossed the 0.4% margin at t = 358s.
The size of the generators power reduction was 2.8MW for
GA and 4.8MW for GB. The voltage profiles in figure 7 show
how the impending blackout was prevented by applying the
two countermeasures determined by the EWEP system.
300 320 340 360 380 400 420
Time in secods after 12:30:00 (CET)
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
V
ol
ta
ge
[p
u
]
Voltage Profiles with Active EWEP System
C
M
1:
G
A
re
d
.
b
y
2
.8
M
W
C
M
2:
G
B
re
d
.
b
y
4
.8
M
W
Fig. 7. Results from repeated blackout simulation, where the EWEP system
applies two countermeasures. Subsequently, the system stabilizes and the
impending blackout avoided. The dashed lines present the original blackout
scenario, for visual comparison of the two cases.
Figure 8 shows the rotor angles of GA and GB relative
to the system’s average rotor angle. The figure demonstrates
that the countermeasures effectively stopped the drifting of the
generators’ rotor angle and the subsequent loss of stability.
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Fig. 8. Rotor angles of GA and GB plotted relative to the mean of all rotor
angles in the system. The effect of EWEP system’s countermeasure is visually
evident as the rotor angle drift ends after the setpoint adjustments.
VII. CONCLUSION
The paper proposed a real-time EWEP system that combines
state-of-the-art methods for stability assessment and counter-
measures into single operational solution. Simulations of the
2003 blackout in Sweden and Denmark were used to test the
system and the results indicated that the system could have
effectively avoided the blackout by applying two relatively
small countermeasures. Such approaches, that in real-time
provides awareness about system security and stability seem
to be a promising path forward when it comes to coping with
critical scenarios in future fluctuating RES based system.
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